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Determinants of Inequality of Wealth-Holding
IN THIS chapter an attempt is made to find the causes of changes in
wealth distribution reported in Chapter 6.
List of Determining Factors
The many factors that determine the degree of inequality of wealth-
holding at any one time may be grouped under the following head-
ings:(1) inequality in the previous generation; (2) the transfer of
wealth between and within generations; (3) differential rates of ac-
cumulation from income; and (4) differential changes in the prices of
assets.
TABLE 101
PERSONAL SECTOR WEALTH IN 1922 PRICES AND IN CURRENT PRICES, 1922—53
(billion dollars)
End ofYear
Gross Estate, Total Wealth Variant
















SOURCE: Table 106, gross estate in cols. 1 and 3.
Estimates of personal wealth do not in themselves indicate how in-
equality is determined but they do give some rough clues to the gen-
eral size of the last three of these factors. If we consider thirty years
as a generation, then the difference in total personal wealth after a
thirty-year span would represent the accumulation of a generation.
In the period 1922-53, this total rose from $348 billion to $821 billion
in 1922 prices (Table 101). Roughly two-fifths (that is, 348 divided
by 821) of the property owned in 1953 may thus be said to have come
into the hands of its current owners by transfer between generations in
the form of bequest, gift, insurance proceeds, etc. The remaining
three-fifths represents accumulation by the current generation.
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However, it is interesting that price change is sufficient to mark out
the turning points in the share. That is, the hypothetical share in
column 3 shows the prolonged fall from 1929 to 1949 and the rise in
share from 1922 to 1929 and again from 1949 to 1953. Applying the
price change to the estate composition for each benchmark year (in-
stead of holding to the 1922 composition as in colunm 3) indicates
that the shifts in composition made by the top wealth-holders con-
tributed to a slight fall in share.5 Comparison of columns 4 and 1 of
Table 107 indicates, however, that there is still a considerable fall in
the actual share which is not explained by the price and composi-
tion changes.
Changes in Share of Savings of Top Wealth-Holders
Could the actual fall in share of wealth be explained by a fall in the
top wealth-holders' share of all current saving? On the basis of price
and composition change, the share of wealth should have fallen over
the 1929—49 period from 37 to 33 per cent. In actual fact, however,
the share fell from 38 to 22 per cent. On the family basis, the share
fell from 33 to 29 per cent over the longer 1922—53 period (Table
107, ccl. 2). The importance of the family measure is discussed in the
section on transfer of wealth below.
Change in the price of assets, as discussed above, takes account
of realized and unrealized capital gains. Some of these gains in turn
arise out of corporate saving. Personal saving out of income, as dis-
cussed below, excludes the effects of change in the price of assets, but
ideally should include saving in the form of consumer durables, since
the latter are included in national balance sheets and estate tax wealth.
Aside from price change, the top group can maintain its share of
wealth only if its saving is the same percentage of total personal saving
as its original wealth was of total wealth. Thus, to maintain the 1922
share of 32 per cent, the top group had to account for at least 32 per
cent of the saving. (The reader may wish to refer to Chart 36 in this
connection. This is a purely mathematical relationship. There is no
reason why this group should account for 32 per cent of the saving.)
The particular question here is whether the top 1 per cent of wealth-
holders has a smaller share of saving than the shares of wealth mdi-
In discussing composition change, it is relevant to note that the top group
reduced its debt-to-asset ratio in 1945—53. In doing so, it reduced its share of
personal sector liabilities (Table 97). Hence, one reason for the top group's ioss
of share was its decision to get out of debt, relatively speaking, while the rest
of the population was adding to its assets by going into debt.
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cated in column 4 of Table 107. If they do have a smaller share, is it
small enough to explain the complete drop in share of wealth over the
full period?
Digressionon Relationships Between Wealth Inequality
and In come Inequality
Before estimating the shares of saving of top wealth-holders, let us
digress to consider some of the relationships among saving, income in-
equality, and wealth inequality.
One determinant of inequality in wealth-holdingisdifferen-












85and over .3 0.6 65,000 19.5 1.7
80to85 .6 L2 60,000 36.0 3.1
70to8O 1.9 3.8 55,000 104.5 8.9
60to7O 5.6 11.3 45,000 252.0 21.4
50to6O 8.0 16.1 35,000 280.0 23.7
40to5O 10.2 20.5 25,000 255.0 21.6
30to4O 11.6 23.3 15,000 174.0 14.8
20to3O 11.5 23.1 5,000 57.5 4 9
Total20añclover49.7 100.0 23,712 1,178.5 100.0
wealth or small amounts of wealth accumulate wealth at a faster rate
than those with large inheritances, accumulation may moderate the de-
gree of inequality over time. The reverse would be the case, of course,
if the rate of accumulation is higher for those who inherit relatively
large amounts.
If there were no inheritance and the rate of accumulation among
all adults were uniform, a moderate degree of inequality would obtain.
Suppose that all males aged 0 to 19 had no wealth, but starting at age
20 each one accumulated property at the rate of $1,000 (including
interest) per year. Those reaching the age of 85 would have estates of
$65,000 and so on. Under these assumptions, the top estate owners,
who would all be in the older age groups, would have a disproportion-
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TABLE 108
HYPOTHETICAL DISTRIBUTION OP WEALTH AMONG ADULT MALESS
that they all
(including interest) and that
accumulate wealth at identical rate of $1,000
they all start with no estate at age 20.
per yearINEQUALITY OF WEALTH-HOLDING
By shifting over to current prices, the importance of price change
can be seen. In 1922 prices total personal sector wealth changed by
$473 billion (from $348 billion in 1922 to $821 billion in 1953), but
in current prices it changed by $890 billion (from $348 billion to
$1,238 billion). Therefore, $417 billion of the latter rise was due to
price change. Of the $1,238 billion of personal wealth in 1953, $348
billion (or 28 per cent) was accumulated by previous generations,
$473 billion (or 38 per cent) was accumulated by the current genera-
tion, and $417 billion (or 34 per cent) arose out of price change dur-
ing the lifetime of the current generation. This method of estimating
overstates the relative importance of accumulation, as opposed to
price change, since it does not isolate the effect of price change on the
assets acquired out of money saved between 1922 and 1953. As noted
before, these data do not give any indication of how the several factors
influenced the degree of inequality of wealth-holding.
Relating these data to estate tax wealth estimates provides more
insight into the inequality question. National balance sheet estimates
and estate tax data are not fully adequate to determine the importance
of the factors that contribute to changes in inequality. They do, how-
ever, furnish us with the basis for some rough estimates of the general
direction of the effect of these factors. Such rough estimates may point
up the needs and perhaps offer bases for further research by other
methods into the causes of inequality.'
We begin with the observed finding of a general decline in in-
equality of wealth-holding from 1922 to 1953. The share of personal
sector wealth of the top 1 per cent of adults fell from 32 to 25 per
cent in this period (Table 102). The share of the top 2 per cent of
families fell from 32 to 29 per cent in the same period. In order to
discover what caused this fall in share, we shall study the effect of the
following factors:(1) price change, (2) saving, and (3) changes in
transfer of wealth.
1Furtherinsight into the determinants of inequality requires a more sophisticated
analysis than is employed here. Such an analysis might include representation of
the population by a model in which the various types of families and individuals
in the real world could be given an explicit role. The assumed behavior and
interaction of these units over time could then be studied by simulation techniques.
Before such a study can be carried out more data and more knowledge of the
interrelationships among the many variables need to be developed. For instance,
how does saving differ by age within estate size? How does receipt of a large
inheritance alter patterns of saving and investment? What connection is there
between wealth-ranking and extraordinary capital gains? What personal charac-
teristics are associated with significant loss of rank in wealth-holding? Are the
people who enjoy capital gains also the ones who save most? How much stability
is there in the population of the top 1 per cent of wealth-holders?
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TABLE 102





All Top I Per Cent
in Top I Per Cent Gross Estatea Adults of Adults
Year (thousands) Held by Top 1 Per Cent (dollars)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1922 651 32 5,342 172,700
1929 744 38 7,009 264,200
1939 855 33 4,989 163,100
1945 929 26 7,777 200,600
1949 980 22 9,619 215,500
1953 1,030 25 11,968 303,900
a Totalwealth variant.
Price Change as a Determinant of Inequality2
Let us think of change in the value of assets owned as a source of
wealth distinct from either inheritance or accumulation out of current
money income. (It should carefully be noted that we are assigning
corporate saving to the "price change" effect rather than to the "say-
ing" effect by this distinction.) Two kinds of change in value may be
noted. One is particular or relative change and the other is general
price change. Even in the absence of a general inflationary or de-
flationary movement in which most prices and incomes move in the
same direction, there are, of course, many changes in the relative
prices of individual pieces of property. Indeed, individual wealth
items, other than liquid assets and insurance, are constantly fluctuat-
ing in money value. Land, a capital good, a security, a patent right, or
other right to income has value only insofar as it has a prospective net
yield, and its current value is the result of dividing that prospective
net yield by the going rate of interest. Hence, when either the prospec-
tive net yield or the going rate of interest is altered, the market value
of the wealth item is altered. Yields of property are affected either
favorably or unfavorably by new discoveries of natural resources,
changes in technique, in consumer preferences, in accessibility to
markets, and other changes. Corporate stock may change in price be-
cause of corporate saving. Because of these changes, individual owners
of property are likely to rise or fall in wealth-holder rank over the
years.
In this section, only the effects of price change upon inequality are con-
sidered. Some other effects of price change are discussed in Chapter 5 and in
Appendix B.
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Change in the general price level as it affects broad types of
property (e.g., all stocks) will also affect inequality of wealth-holding.
In general, the major drift of price change in the years since the de-
pression has been such as to favor investment in equities and to dis-
advantage investment in assets of constant dollar value or of fixed
yield. If two persons in 1939 had gross estates of $30,000, and one of
them held all equities, such as real estate, stock, and interest in unin-
corporated business, while the other held liquid assets or debt claims,
the one with equities would have been quite likely to rise into the
$60,000 and over class by 1953, while the one with no equities most
assuredly would not.
Since the depression stock prices have more than tripled and real
estate prices (as indicated by the composite construction cost index)8
have risen almost as much (Table 67). Over the period since, 1935,
the most dramatic short-period change occurred in stock prices from
1949 to 1956, with the greater part of this rise from 1954 to 1956.
The real estate index shows a much more gradual rise over the whole
period. Bonds show relatively little change. Cash and life insurance do
not, of course, change in money value. Mortgages and notes, it may
be assumed, move in the same way as bonds. (Lack of an organized
market for such assets makes this assumption somewhat unreal.) Mis-
cellaneous property includes a mixture of equity and ownership
and is here assumed to move with the level of consumer prices.
Looking at the period before 1940, it appears that one of the most
important changes among the price-sensitive assets was the long slide
in real estate values from the early 1920's to the end of the 1930's.
The radical rise and fall of stock prices around 1929 means that the
selection of a set of beginning and terminal dates is critical to the re-
sult. However, in the period 1922—35 real estate values fell (particu-
larly because of farm land prices) while stock prices rose, which sug-
gests that the price change increased inequality. Also, in the long
period of 1922—53 stock prices rose more than real estate prices.
Tables 103 and 104 show, in terms of the 1953 composition of
estates, that price changes over most but not all of the period here
considered have, in conjunction with typical difference of estate corn-
Apparently residential construction costs have risen somewhat more than
costs of other types of construction (indexes of S. H. Boeckh and associates in
Construction Review). Farm land prices show a movement generally parallel to
that of construction costs (Alvin S. Tostlebe, Capital in Agriculture: Its Formation




position among estate sizes, increased inequality of wealth-holding.
That is, the large estates have tended to appreciate more in size than
the smaller estates. The same general set of relationships is illustrated
in Table 105, which is based upon the 1922 composition of estates.
There is one respect in which the lower estate sizes have tended
to gain through inflation at the expense of the higher estate sizes—and
that is debt position. By having a larger debt-to-asset ratio—in other
words, doing more "trading on the equity"—the former group tends
to be better armed against inflation with debts which could be paid
off in depreciated dollars. Within the top wealth-holder group there is
no important difference in liabilities as a percentage of gross estate
(Table 74). However, top wealth-holders have smaller debts, as a
TABLE 103












proportion of their gross estate, than the rest of the population. For
both groups there is a strong association of younger age and high
ratios of debt to net worth. While the top wealth-holders' debt-to-asset
ratio is 9 per cent, that of the rest of the population is 12 per cent
(Table 63). This means that differential gain through decline in value
of debts would offset very little the general trend of greater gain for
the higher estate sizes.
It is clear from the above discussion that prices moved from 1922
to 1953 in such a way as to increase inequality. One way to quantify
the importance of that effect is to deflate, using 1922 as the base year,
the holdings of the top 1 per cent of wealth-holders and of the whole
personal sector in each succeeding year for which we have share esti-
mates. In this way, we find that the share on a deflated basis is less
than on a current dollar basis in each benchmark year after 1922
(Chart 36 and Table 106). At the end of the series in 1953, the share
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TABLE 104
CHANGES IN MONEY VALUE OF TYPICAL 1953 ESTATES OF SELECTED SIZES
FROM APPLICATION OF ASSET PRICES OF SELECTED YEARS
(dollars)
AssetPricesofYearsShown
1922 1925 1929 1935 1940 1946 1953 1956
$65,000 ESTATE, 1953 COMPOSITION
Real estate 12,86112,091 10,8378,6359,78415,20523,465 25,222
U.S. bonds 4,6144,859 5,0064,2104,790 4,893 4,485 4,405
State and local bonds 45 54 52 59 67 76 65 63
Other bonds 694 717 723 856 944 1,002 910 886
Stock 4,4225,86113,6845,7016,059 9,62313,000 24,500
Other assets 20,40220,78220,17415,66515,881 19,47323,075 23,261
Total 45,03844,36450,47635,12637,52550,27265,000 78,337
$250,000 ESTATE, 1953 COMPOSITION
Real estate 36,16033,98430,39724,28827,52242,76866,000 70,943
U.S. bonds 12,34513,001 13,39311,26412,81713,091 12,000 11,786
State and local bonds1,2231,444 1,4111,5881,806 2,049 1,750 1,700
Other bonds 2,0982,167 2,1862,5872,853 3,028 2,750 2,677
Stock 29,42238,99991,05337,93940,31864,02786,500163,018
Other assets 62,83264,31161,94454,99055,74768,35481,000 81,653
Total 144,080 153,906200,384 132,656 141,063193,317250,000331,777
$1,500,000 ESTATE, 1953 COMPOSITION
Real estate 83,15078,29970,02155,75263,17698,172151,500162,847
U.S. bonds 44,75347,12948,54940,83345,46247,45443,500 42,726
State and local bonds72,32785,39683,46893,916 106,812121,198103,500100,530
Other bonds 11,44211,82011,92414,11415,56116,52015,000 14,601
Stock 300,510 398,332930,000 387,503 411,799653,967883,5001,665,044
Other assets 234,963 240,501231,638 205,703 208,534255,696303,000305,443
Total 747,145 861,477 1,364,600 797,821 852,344 1,193,007 1,500,0002,291,191
AGGREGATE GROSS ESTATE OF TOP WEALTH-HOLDERS, 1953 COMPOSITION (BILLION DOLLARS)
Real estate 32,69331,76229,39524,14927,36542,52465,623 70,538
U.S. bonds 16,83017,72418,25815,35617,47317,84616,359 16,068
State and local bonds7,1578,450 8,2609,29410,57011,99310,242 9,948
Other bonds 2,1722,244 2,2642,6802,954 3,136 2,848 2,772
Stock 39,03151,736120,78950,32953,48584,938114,750216,258
Other assets 63,93765,81362,77656,34157,11670,03482,990 83,659
Total 161,820 177,729241,742 158,149 168,963230,471292,803a399,243
AVERAGE OF NON-TOP-WEALTH-HOLDERS
(ESTATE SIZE, $7,960, 1953 COMPOSITION)
Real estate 1,9001,771 1,6391,3251,502 2,397 3,660 3,716
U.S. bonds 360 379 391 371 400 391 350 347
State and local bonds
Other bonds
Stock 71 95 232 90 94 145 210 396
Other assets 3,0333,091 2,9992,8212,841 3,229 3,740 3,773
Total 5,3645,336 5,2614,6074,837 6,162 7,960 8,232
aNotadjusted to account for those returns with no age specified.
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TABLE 105
PRICE CHANGE UPON 1922 ESTATES
SouRcE: Derived from Table 106.
CHART 36








and in 1922 Dollars, 1922—56
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EFFECTS OF OF Two SIZES,1922—53
Year
Average Estate for









1922 5,342 100 172,700 100
1929 6,784 127 284,955 165
1933 4,594 86 160,511 93
1939 5,182 97 224,510 130
1945 6,464 121 267,685 155
1949 7,746 145 295,317 171
1953 8,501 161 376,486 218
PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN MONEYVALUEOF ESTATE
1922—53 +61 +118
1929—53 +25 + 32
1933—53 +84 +133
1939—53 +63 + 67
1945—53 +31 + 41
1949—53 +10 + 27
1922—33 —14 —8
1929—33 —33 — 44
1929—49 +14 + 3
1933—49 +68 + 83















ONE PER CENT OF ADULTS
1922PRIcEs
Gross estate 347.8100.0 347.8 32.3112.3 32.3










'CALCULATION OF SHARE OF WEALTHa HELD BY Top
WITH EACH ASSET TYPE REDUCED TO
PersonalShare ofWealth
SectorPersonalof TopShare of Per-
Personal WealthWealthI % insonal Wealth
Sector in 1922Held by1922 Held by
WealthAsset PricesTop 1 %DollarsTop 1 % in
(bill. Price (bill. (per (bill.1922 Dollars
dollars)Indexesdollars)cent)dollars)(per cent)




























Economic estate 296.6100.0 33.9
Real estate 184.4
Structure 108.4114.03 95.1 17.3 16.45









































Insurance 17.6 17.6 .27 4.75
Misc. property 78.6102.37 76.8 29.0 22.27INEQUALITY OF WEALTH-HOLDING
TABLE 106 (continued)
PersonalShare ofWealth
SectorPersonalof TopShare of Per-
Personal WealthWealth1 % insonal Wealth
Sector in 1922Held by1922 Held by
WealthAsset PricesTop I %DollarsTop 1 % in
(bill. Price (bill. (per (bill.1922 Dollars
dollars)Indexesdollars)cent)dollars)(per cent)




Land 53.645.54117.7 13.7 16.12
U.S.govt. bonds 8.9108.9 91.0 7.5
State.and local bonds 7.9122.81 6.4 100.0 6.4
Corporate bonds 14.5134.15 10.8 75.5 8.15
Corporatestock 71.4143.39 49.8 69.0 34.36
Cash andmortgages 70.5 31 .5
Cash 57.1 57.1 17.99
Mortgages 13.4134.15 9.9 3.12
Pensionfunds 7.2 7.2 6.0 4.32
Insurance 29.2 29.2 17.4 5.08
lvtisc. property 60.7 82.96 73.2 19.0 13.91





Structures 148.8160.6792.6 11.1 10.28
Land 83.7 70.42118.9 11.1 13.20
U.S.govt. bonds 62.4144.2243.9 32.5 14.27
State and local bonds 9.5144.06 6.6100.0 6.60
Corporate bonds 9.5105.58 9,0 78.5 7.07
Corporate stock 109.0180.1760.5 61.7 37.33
Cashand mortgages
Cash 116.8 16.8 17.0 19.86
Mortgages 17.3105.58 16.39 34.7 6.34
Pension funds 28.3
.28.3 5.9 1.67
Insurance 44.8 44.8 17.3 7.75
Misc, property 92.4107.3986.0421.4 21.24
Grossestate 722.5 623.8325.8145.61 23.3
Liabilities 50.7 27.0





SectorPersonalof TopShare of Per-
Personal WealthWealthI % insonal Wealth
Sector in 1922Held by1922 Held by
WealthAssetPricesTop 1 %DollarsTop I % in
















SOURCE: Col. 1: Table 90 and accompanying appendix tables; cal. 2: Table 67;
Co1. 3:cal. 1. ÷ col. 2;col. 4: Table 97; col. 5: col. 4 times col. 3; col. 6: cal. 5 + col.3.
aTotalwealth variant.
b The index used for all land is that for farm land. This yields an improbable change
iii the value of land in the personal sector in the period 1922—29. 1922 was a near-peak
year inthe price of farmland and it is probable that nonfarm land had a different
history. Slightly different results in the share of gross estate shown in col. 5 would
follow from use of a different price index for land.
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Real estate 336.3
Structures 241.7232.46103.75 10.5 10.89
Land 94.691.08103.8710.5 10.91
U.S. govt. bonds 64.4141.52 45.51 •35.8 16.29
State andlocalbonds 11.5133.02 8.65 77.0 6.66
Corporate bonds 6.6106.31 6.20 78.0 4.84
Corporate stock 106.4181.08 58.76 64.9 38.4
Cash andmortgages
Cash 130.6 130.60 18.9 24.68
Mortgages 22.9106.31 21.54 32.0 6.89
Pension funds 44.4 44.40 5.5 2.44
Insurance 60.0 60.00 15.0 9.00
Misc. property 159.6142.17112.2615.0 16.84
Gross estate 942.7 695.54 22.4 147.58 21.2
Liabilities 19.0




Land 120.0110.34108.75 12.5 13.59
U.S. govt. bonds 60.4 131.11 46.07 31.8 14.65
Stateandlocalbonds 16.0143.10 11.18100.0 11.18
Corporate bonds 6.1 97.2 6.28 77.5 4.87
Corporate stock 155.7294.03 52.95 76.0 40.24
Cash andmortgages
Cash 160.0 160.00 24.5 39.20
Mortgages 31.2 97.2 32.10 30.5 9.79
Pension funds 63.5 63.50 5.5 3.49
Insurance 78.2 78.20 11.5 8.99
Misc. property 220.8159.77138.20 15.5 21.42
Gross estate 1,237.6 821.28 25.3 182.93 22.3
Liabilities 132.8 20.0
Economic estate 27.4INEQUALITY OF WEALTH-HOLDING
of the top 1 per cent of adults was 22 per cent on a deflated basis and
25 per cent on a current basis. This would suggest that the price ef-
fect was operating over the period to increase the share of the top
group by 3 percentage points. The converging of the current and con-
stant dollar lines in Chart 36 indicates, however, that for 1929—49
price change was working to moderate inequality.
We gain more insight into the importance of price change by dis-
regarding all other change. We take the actual holdings of all persons
TABLE 107
ACTUAL AND HYPOTHETICAL SHARES OF WEALTH-HOLDER GRouPs
IN PERSONAL SECTOR GROSS ESTATE,a 1922—53
(per cent)
Actual Shares of










Changes in Top 1% of Top 2% of
AdultsFamilies HoldingsCompositionShare of SavingbTransfer of Wealtho
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1922 32 33 32 32 32 32
1929 38 — 40 37 38 —
1933 30 35 — —
1939 33 — 37 36 36
1945 26 — 36 35 30 —
1949 22 — 33 33 27 —
1953 25 29 38 37 28 25
B Totalwealth variant.
b Assuming top group accounted for 44 per cent of all personal saving in 1922—29,
10 per cent in 1930—49, and 15 per cent in 1950—53. These estimates are explained later
(see pp. 234 if).
°Derivationis explained later (see pp. 237 if).
and of the top 1 per cent in 1922 and adjust each type of asset for
price change. This method assumes no saving and no change in com-
position.4 The results of this calculation are shown in column 3 of
Table 107. They indicate that, on the basis of price change alone, it is
not possible to explain fully the actual loss of the top wealth-holders.
'Thereader should be alerted to the gross crudity of this method, which takes
the 1922 population forward through time, assuming that nothing changes but
the price of their assets. In fact, of course, some people die, others are born, some
rise into the top1 per cent ranking, and others fall out of it over time. This
method makes no allowance for the great variations within either the top 1 per
cent or the lower 99 per cent in type of assets held. Also the simple assumption
is made that a single price index for one asset, e.g., corporate stock, can be
applied to that asset for wealth-holders at all wealth levels without regard for
any other characteristics. Some alternatives to this general method are mentioned
in footnote 1.
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ate share of the wealth. The top 1.8 per cent of adult males would
have 4.8 per cent of the wealth (Table 108).
However, people accumulate wealth at very different rates, some
saving large amounts each year aridsomedissaving, or decumulating
wealth. The causes for these differences are manifold and include such
incalculables as individual attitudes toward saving, and motivation
and ability to systematically control household and business accounts
TABLE 109
COMPARISON OF DISTRIBUTION OF MONEY INCOME AND NET
WORTH AMONG SPENDING UNITS, 1952—53
Per Cent of Spending Units Per Cent of Money Income

















Per Cent of Spending Units













SOuRcE: 1953 Survey of Consumer Finances, reprinted from Federal Reserve Bulletin,
1953, Supplementary Table 5, p. 11
toward the end of estate building. Aside from these individual dif-
ferences, there are broad socio-economic characteristics which are
useful in marking off the groups which have relatively high rates of
saving. One such characteristic is income, which is a major determi-
nant of saving rates. In all postwar years the top decile of spending
units, ranked by income, has accounted for about three-fourths of the
saving and the top four deciles for 100 per cent of the positive saving.
(If we assume in Table 108 that throughout their lifetime one-half the
males save at the rate of $2,000 per year and the other half do not
save at all, then the degree of inequality would be considerably higher
than in the previous example, with the top 0.9 per cent of adult males
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having 4.8 per cent of the wealth and the top 2.8 per cent having 13.7
per cent.)
Hence, it seems that the degree of income inequality is an impor-
tant factor in differential rates of accumulation and hence in the de-
gree of wealth inequality. All other things remaining the same, one
CHART37
Lorenz Curves of Total Money Income and Net Worth Among
Spending Units Ranked by Income and Net Worth












Per cent of spending units
Source: Table 109.
wouldexpect a lesser inequality of income to lead to a lesser inequality
of wealth.
In this connection, it is of interest to compare inequality of wealth-
holding with inequality of income. Perhaps the most sensible way to
compare the two is to consider wealth distribution by itself and income
distribution by itself. When this is done, as in Table 109, it is quite
clear that wealth is more unequally distributed than income (Chart 37).
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The selection of the basis for ranking makes a difference. When
spending units are ranked by net worth, wealth is more unequally dis-
tributed than income. (This particular finding is most relevant to the
problem at hand.) The top 11 per cent of spending units ranked by
net worth had only 24 per cent of the total income in 1953, but they
had 60 per cent of total net worth. When spending units are ranked
by income, however, the top 9 per cent are found to receive 28 per
TABLE 110
DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME AMONG ALL PERSONS, 1951
AggregateIncome
Total Money Population Million
Income in Thousands Per Cent Dollars Per Cent
1951 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Loss 287 0.2 — 0.0
No income 79,786 52.7 — 0.0
$1 to $500 11,553 7.6 2,888 1.8
$500 to $1,000 8,968 5.9 6,726 3.7
$1,000 to $1,500 5,955 3.9 7,444 4,1
$1,500 to $2,000 6,314 4.2 11,050 6.0
$2,000 to $2,500 7,246 4.8 16,304 8.9
$2,500 to $3,000 6,385 4.2 17,559 9.6
$3,000 to $3,500 6,959 4.6 22,617 12.3
$3,500 to $4,000 5,309 3.5 19,909 10.8
$4,000 to $4,500 3,946 2.6 16,771 9.1
$4,500 to $5,000 2,296 1.5 10,906 5.9
$5,000 to $6,000 3,013 2.0 16,572 9.0
$6,000 to $7,000 1,363 0.9 8,860 4.8
$7,000 to $10,000 1,220 0.8 9,150 5.0
$10,000 to $15,000 502 0.3 6,275 3.4
$15,000 and over 430 0.3 10,750 5.8
Total 151,532 100.0 183,781 100.0
SOURCE: Cols. I and 2 from Herman P. Miller, Income of the American People, New
York, 1955; col. 3 computed by multiplying midpoints of income range times col. 1,
$25,000 assumed to be the average for the top income group.
cent of total money income and to hold 39 per cent of total net worth.
It is also interesting to note that on this ranking by income the lowest
25 per cent have only 6 per cent of the income, but hold 14 per cent
of the net worth.6 This means that the Lorenz curves of wealth and
income would cross above the middle decile when the two distributions
are made with a ranking of spending units by income.
01953Survey of Consumer Finances, reprinted from Federal Reserve Bulletin,
1953, Supplementary Table 5, p. 11. The cross rankings of income by net worth
are not reproduced in the text but may be found in the 1953 Survey of Consumer
Finances.
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In the study of top wealth-holders, the unit for ranking is neces-
sarily the individual and, hence, to have a direct basis for comparing
our fragmentary data on wealth distribution with the distribution of
income, we should have a distribution of income among all the indi-
viduals in the population. We have fashioned such a distribution in
Table 110, which shows that over half the people in 1951 received no
income and the lower three-fourths of the population received only
15.6 'per cent of all income, while the top 1.4 per cent received 14.2
per cent of all income. The latter figures may be compared with the
finding that the top 1.04 per cent of all persons in 1953 held 28.5 per
cent of basic variant wealth. It is apparent, then, that on this basis
wealth is more unequally distributed than income.
Estimate of Share of Saving of Top
In 1950 the Survey of Consumer Finances indicated that the top 3 per
cent of spending units (those with $60,000 and over of total assets),
ranked by total assets, were responsible for about 15 per cent of all
saving.8 The top 3 per cent of spending units is a somewhat larger
group than the top 1 per cent of adults referred to in Table 107, but
'A review of the literature reveals that understanding of who saves is widely
recognized as a major gap in our knowledge. Thus Kuznets writes in Shares of
Upper Income Groups in Income and Savings (New York, NBER, 1953, P. 173):
"The data do not yield adequate annual estimates of even total savings of individ-
uals, let alone savings of upper separately from those of lower income groups."
Instead of giving share of savings by top groups, he merely ranked the years,
saying, "we used ranks instead of the actual ratios because lack of confidence in
the series on individuals' total savings made the ratios suspect"(ibid., p. 178,
footnote 1).
Similarly, Goldsmith observes that "one of the most serious gaps in our knowl-
edge of the structural changes in the savings of households is the absence of infor-
mation extending over long periods about the distribution of saving among saver
groups of different income and wealth levels, different occupations, different ages,
and other characteristics" (A Study of Saving in the United States, I, Princeton,
1956, p. 161). He does suggest that "the time series point to a decline in the
share of upper income groups in savings due largely to an increase in the share
of saving through consumer durables and through pension and retirement funds,
most of which is attributable to the lower income groups, and part of which is
voluntary" (ibid., p. 162).
Irwin Friend and Stanley Schor conclude that "given the margin of error in
the historical data on saving obtained from consumer surveys, little can be said
with any certainty about the trends in the proportion of saving accounted for by
the upper income groups. There is some reason to believe that this proportion has
declined secularly in view of the evidence of a long-term decline in the income
share of upper income groups" ("Who Saves?" in The Review of Economics and
Statistics, May 1959, pp. 238—239).
Table A-15.
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it would seem to be a fair estimate that the latter group accounted for
about 15 per cent of all saving. Unfortunately, there are no similar
data available on what this share was for earlier years.
There are some historical data on the share of savings of the top
percentiles of income recipients. We have referred in Chapter 6 to the
findings of Kuznets that income inequality declined over the period
here under study. Kuznets does not make firm estimates of the share
of saving of the top 1 per cent of income recipients. He does, however,
provide the basis for a rough estimate assuming a constant savings-in-
come ratio. Our estimates derived from this (Table ill) show a
countercyclical change in the share of saving of the top income recip-
ients and a long secular decline in that share. It is thus estimated that
the share was 44 per cent in 1922—29, 115 per cent in 1930—39, 11
per cent in 1941—45, and 19 per cent in 1946—49.
But what is the connection between the top 1 per cent of income
recipients and the top 1 per cent of wealth-holders? It would appear
from inspection of Survey of Consumer Finances data that more than
one-half of the top 1 per cent of income-receiving units have $60,000
or more in assets and that about one-half of those units with $60,000
in assets would have enough income to place them in the top 1 per
cent of the income distribution in recent years. Thus we might deduce
that the top wealth-holders would account for more than one-half of
the saving of the top 1 per cent of income recipients. This assumes
not merely a random association but a positive association between in-
come and wealth in the top ranges. The share of saving of the top 3
per cent of spending units (roughly the same as the top 1 per cent of
adults) was, we have already noted, 15 per cent in 1950. This checks
closely with the estimate for 1946—48, which we get from Table 111.
This gives us some basis for switching over to using the whole series of
savings estimates in the latter table. However, it is doubtful that the
overlap between the top wealth-holders and the top income recipients
has always been the same as it was in 1950. This doubt arises from a
series that shows what share of all property income has been received
by upper income groups. Property income is, of course, a reflection of
wealth-holding and hence deserves our interest. In 1948 the top 1
per cent of income recipients got about one-fourth of all property in-
come, and property income was about one-third of the income of this
group. The overlap indicated by these data would appear to have de-
dined over the years, with a fall from one-half to one-third in the
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TABLE 111
CALCULATION OF SHARE OF SAVING OF ONE PER CENT OF INCOME RECIPIENTS, 1922—48
Total
PersonalShare ofShare of
Saving Col. 5 Col. 6
PersonalShare IncomeSavings Less Saving Saving
Dispos-of Income of Top I % of Top 1%TotalConsumer of Top I % of Top 1 %
ableGoing toof Income of Income PersonalDurablesof Income of Income
IncomeTop I %RecipientsRecipientsSavingSavingRecipients Recipients
(mill. (per (mill. (mill. (mill. (mill. (per (per
Year doll.) cent) doll.) doll.) doll.) doll.) cent) cent)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1922 58,719 12.3 7,220 3,090 6,300 5,400 49 57
1923 68,138 11.6 7,900 3,330 9,880 7,300 34 45
1924 72,737 12.1 8,800 3,740 8,620 6,820 43 55
1925 75,510 12.9 9,700 4,160 10,740 8,110 39 51
1926 75,736 13.1 9,920 4,260 10,100 7,400 42 57
1927 77,474 13.5 10,450 4,510 10,070 8,390 45 53
1928 81,311 13.7 11,140 4,820 6,010 4,350 80 109
1929 81,156 13.6 11,040 4,780 11,490 9,540 42 50
1930 72,275 13.6 9,830 4,210 5,620 6,280 75 66
1931 61,249 13.0 7,960 3,410+2,470 3,570 94
1932 45,982 12.7 5,840 2,490 —3,270—1,170
1933 44,330 11.8 5,230 2,210 —3,800—2,310
1934 54,272 11.6 6,290 2,640 —950 —290
1935 56,807 11.1 6,310 2,640 2,350 1,790
1936 64,709 11.6 7,510 3,190 5,280 3,510 60 91
1937 70,267 11.5 8,080 3,410 7,320 5,360 46 63
1938 64,905 10.5 6,820 2,820 3,720 3,580 76 78
1939 69,345 10.8 7,490 3,120 6,850 5,500 46 56
1940 74,392 10.4 7,740 3,210 8,540 6,310 38 51
1941 89,408 9.0 8,050 3,320 13,970 10,890 24 30
1942 110,676 7.1 7,860 3,130 33,240 31,930 9 10
1943 128,513 5.5 7,070 2,760 36,170 34,660 8 8
1944 142,878 5.7 8,140 3,090 39,300 37,640 8 8
1945 146,778 5.7 8,360 3,210 34,410 33,660 9 9
1946 158,055 6.0 9,480 3,790 22,530 16,130 17 24
1947 172,623 5.9 10,180 4,070 20,190 11,110 20 37
1948 189,617 6.3 11,950 4,780 26,720 16,190 18 29
SOURCE: Col. 1: Total income receipts (Kuznets, Shares of Upper Income Groups, p.
571, Table 114, col. 11) plus imputed rent (ibid., p. 578, Table 115, col. 6) minus
federal income (ibid., p. 578, Table 115, col. 7); col. 2: ibid., p. 596, Table 118, col.
4; col. 3: col. 1 times col. 2; col. 4: col. 3 times savings-income ratio (ibid., p. 176, Table
47, col. 2); col. 5: Goldsmith, Saving in U.S., I, p. 353; col. 6: Goldsmith, Saving in U.S.,
I; col. 7: col. 4 divided by cal. 5; col. 8: col. 4 divided by col. 6.
Noit: There are several difficulties in this table involving the concept of saving. As
mentioned in the text, the ideal concept for our purposes is the one that includes con-
sumer durables. However, the estimate of savings done by the top income recipients in
col. 4 excludes consumer durables, as does the estimate of total personal savings in col.
6. Hence the percentages in col. 8 exclude cohsumer durable saving and are doubtless
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latter ratio from the 1920's to the 1950's.9 One might suspect that
the break in the relationship occurred with the depression.
Working from this fragmentary information, we suggest that
plausible estimates (and here we are leaning toward the greatest pos-
sible drop in share) for the share of saving of the top 1 per cent of
wealth-holders would be 44 per cent in the 1920's, 10 per cent in the
depression and war periods, and 15 per cent in 1949—53. Applying
these estimates to the share of wealth which would be held by the top
group on the basis of price and composition changes1° yields the in-
teresting finding that such a drastic change in assumed savings pat-
terns would not be enough to explain the drop in share of wealth
which we found on an individual basis (Table 107, cols. 5 and 1).
it is enough to explain the fall indicated on the basis of
families (Table 107, col. 2). The fact that we do not find a sharp fall
in share from 1929 to 1939, even with the most extreme assumption
about fall in relative saving, is the principal reason for suspecting that
some other factor was at work in that depression decade which must
have caused a greater fall to appear in the individual wealth-holder
series than in the family series. That factor, we suspect, was changing
practice in transfer of wealth. If we can thus account for this diverg-
ence between the individual and the family series, it would seem fair
to say that the observed fall in the family series is fully explained by
price and savings changes.
The Process of Transfer of Wealth
The practices of transfer of wealth and the institutional arrangements
restraining and encouraging certain kinds of transfer may increase or
moderate the degree of inequality of wealth in the following genera-
tion. If those persons with large estates divide them among a larger
number of heirs, donees, and beneficiaries than is generally the case
for those with smaller estates, the effect will be to moderate in-
°SeeTables 59 and 60, which show these relationships for 1919—38, and
Kuznets, Shares of Upper In come Groups, p. 649.
10Themethod used here is the one described on p. 228. Footnote 4 is also
relevant here.
too high on that account, since consumer durable saving is less concentrated among
higher income groups than other types of saving. On the other hand, the percentages in
col. 7 are probably too low since the estimate of top group saving (col. 4) excludes con-
sumer durables, while the estimate of total saving (col. 5) includes consumer durables.
However, it is the direction of change in share of saving that we are interested in here,
and both co]. 7 and col. 8 indicate similar changes.
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equality.11 The rate schedules of estate, inheritance, and gift taxes are
designed to have that effect. These progressive tax rate schedules also
tend to divert a larger share of larger estates than of smaller estates to
the public sector in the form of taxes.12 This system of rates also en-
courages philanthropic gifts, which remove wealth from the personal
sector. A principal route of escape from the designed effect of trans-
fer taxes—namely, the splitting up of large estates—is the use of
personal trust funds, but this route occasions the loss of a considerable
part of the bundle of property rights.
Taxes have two kinds of effect upon inequality: they discourage
the accumulation and encourage the splitting up of large estates. The
equalizing effect of the whole battery of transfer taxes, including
estate, inheritance, and gift taxes, is doubtless quite substantial, al-
though it is beyond the scope of this study to measure this effect
quantitatively. Neither isit possible here to appraise in detail the
direction of change in equalizing effect over recent decades. However,
from examination of tax law changes, it would seem plausible to con-
clude that the greatest degree of equalizing occurred in the decade of
the 1930's and early war The postwar period has seen some
In a study of the Wisconsin inheritance tax, Wallace I. Edwards found that
estates valued at $100,000 and over had an average of more than nine beneficiaries
per estate. He also found that movement of property is "what might be described
as downward by somewhat less than one generation, 63 per cent of the transferees
were down one generation, 11 per cent down two or more generations, 24 per cent
same generation, 1 per cent up one or two generations ("Wisconsin Inheritance
Taxation," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1953, pp. 139
and 313). Statistics of Income for 1946 and 1947 (Part I, Tables 7 and 9) show
the number of estate tax returns by heirs, devisees, and legatees and also the
number of returns by number of children. Of 20,899 returns in 1946, 6,774
report no children; 5,899 report that the recipients of bequests are children only.
The data suggest that larger estates tend to have more heirs than smaller estates.
G. Z. Fijalkowski-Bereday, in his paper on "The Equalizing Effects of the
Death Duties" (Oxford Economic Papers, June 1950, pp. 176—196), concludes
that a higher death tax has its main effect on the main bequest. On the other
hand, William McKinstry comes to exactly the opposite conclusion in his study of
Connecticut inheritance tax data. (See his unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, "An
Estimate of the Impact of Increasing Death Tax Rates on Beneficiaries of Federally
Taxable Estates," Yale University, 1959.)
In 1932 the exemption was dropped from $100,000 to $50,000 and in 1935
to $40,000. At the same time the maximum rate of tax went from 20 per cent
on that portion of the estate over $10 million to 70 per cent on that portion over
$50 million. Maximum rates on the gift tax were doubled. For a brief summary
of tax changes from 1913 to 1940, see Sidney Ratner, American Taxation, New
York, 1942, Appendix Table 3. A more recent and detailed account is that of
Louis Eisenstein, "The Rise and Decline of the Estate Tax," Federal Tax Policy
for Economic Growth and Stability, U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on the Eco-
nomic Report, Washington, 1955, pp. 819—847. Also see the special issue of the
California Law Review (March 1950), which offers a critique of estate and gift
taxation.
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relaxing of thiseffectdue to the rise in number of persons with estates
subject to tax and to legislative changes designed to reduce the
severity of the taxes. Most noteworthy among the latter changes was
the introduction of the marital deduction on the estate tax, and the
extension to residents of all states of community property rights for
both federal income and gift tax purposes in 1948.14
The timing of transfers is also an important determinant of in-
equality. If estates are customarily held in the name of the patriarch
or matriarch until his or her death, the effect will be greater inequality
than if estates are divided well in advance of the year of death. Gifts
and bequests to grandchildren rather than to children also tend to
moderate inequality. Laws which permit women and minors to hold
property influence this pattern. Community property law isalso
relevant here. As an increasing percentage of the population is found
in states with this law, the degree of inequality among persons should
be lessened. Widespread ownership of life insurance would alter the
age at which persons appear in the higher estate sizes, to the extent
that life insurance beneficiaries include more relatively young people
than are found among all heirs.
On the other hand, rising longevity would tend to delay the di-
vision of estates and to increase the average age of heirs, thereby in-
creasing inequality. In the period 1922—53 the adult population
became markedly older (Table 112). This, in itself, was clearly a
factor which increased inequality. In 1922, 54 per cent of the adult
population were in the 20 to 40 age bracket and 5 per cent were over
70. In 1953, only 45 per cent were aged 20 to 40 and 7 per cent
were 70 or older. By setting the number of top wealth-holders per
100 in the age groups (as found for 1953 in Table 113) and the
141?ora discussion of this and related matters, see C. Lowell Harriss, "Erosion
of the Federal Estate and Gift Tax Bases," Proceedings of 48th Annual Conference
of National Tax Association, 1955, pp.350—358.Also of interest is G. S. A.
Wheatcroft, "The Anti-Avoidance Provisions of the Law of Estate Duty in the
United Kingdom," National Tax Journal, March 1957, pp. 46—56. A most ingenious
effort to measure the combined effect of personal income, gift, and estate taxes
upon the distribution of wealth is that of Charles Stewart, published in 1938. He
related income and property classes to each other, projected the accumulation
of estate by classes by assuming a consumption function. He then compared the
distribution of wealth at the beginning and end of a thirty-year period. He con-
cluded that the top 11 per cent of income recipients (considering only the groups
with more than $5,000 income), who owned 57 per cent of property in 1930,
would increase their share of property to 61 per cent in thirty years if no personal
taxes upon income or wealth were imposed. However, he concluded, 1936 tax
rates would reduce their share of property to 51 per cent. (Gerhard Colm and
Fritz Lehmann, Economic Consequences of Recent American Tax Policy, Supple-
ment I, New York, 1938, Appendix A.)
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average estate size by age (as found for 1953 in Table 45) against
the changing age and sex'5 composition (Table 112), we are able to
quantify the effect of aging upon inequality. The hypothetical share
of the top 1 per cent of adults rises, due to aging, by 2 percentage
points on a base of 20. The rise is slightly higher if we use 1922 estate
size by age and number of top wealth-holders per 100 in 1922 relation-
ships; in that case the share of the top 1 per cent rises from 30 to
35 due to aging. It should seem fair to conclude, then, that if there
had been no other changes but the aging of the adult population, the
share of the top 1 per cent would have risen from 32 per cent in 1922
to about 35 per cent in 1953. That is to say, in order to obtain the
observed fall in share of wealth, there had to be factors at work to
TABLE 112








20to40 17.2 16.8 23.1 23.7
40to60 10.8 9.6 18.2 18.6
60to70 2.7 2.4 5.7 6.0
70andover 1.4 1.5 3.6 4.4
Total 32.1 30.3 50.6 52.7
more than offset the increasing-inequality effect of aging. (Aging is not
here considered to have an effect separate from the saving and price
change effects.)
That there were such factors is apparent from the age data on top
wealth-holders. While the total adult population was getting older,
the top wealth-holders were getting younger. Adjusting the percentage
of the population for comparability, it appears that the median age
of the top 1 per cent of the population fell from 57 in 1922 to 55 in
1953 (despite the fact that for women the median age rose from
53 to 56). The percentage of each age-sex group who were top
wealth-holders in the two years is shown in Table 113. (Top wealth-
holders were a smaller part of the total population in 1922 than in
1953.)
It would appear, then, that top wealth has been shifted to younger
Thehigher percentage of women, in itself, would lead to a prediction of a
lowerfrequency of top wealth-holders.
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TABLE 113
WEALTH-HOLDERS AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ADULT POPULATION,
BY SEX AND AGE GROUP, 1922 AND 1953
. 1922 1953
AgeGroup Male Female Male Female
20to40 0.3 0.1 0.8 0.3
40to60 1.7 0.6 3.2 1.2
60to70 2.7 1.0 3.9 1.7
70andover 3.5 1.4 4.0 2.6
SOURCE: For 1922, Appendix Table A-5; for 1953, Table 35.
TABLE 114
ACTUAL AND HYPOTHETICAL (ASstn4xNo 1922 FREQUENCY RATES) NUMBER OF






















20 to 40 184,800 69,300
MALES
115,500.63 120,000 13.9
40 to 60 582,400 309,400 273,300.47 170,000 45.9
60 to 70 222,300 153,900 68,400 .31 180,000 12.6
70 and over 144,000 126,000 18,000.12 210,000 4.0
Total 1,133,500 658,600 474,900.42 162,000 76.4
FEMALES
20 to 40 71,100 23,700 47,700.66 350,000 17.5
40 to 60 223,200 111,600 111,600.50 190,000 20.9
60 to 70 102,000 60,000 42,000..58 180,000 7.6
70 and over 114,400 61,600 42,800.37 210,000 8.4
Total 510,700 256,900 253,800.50 220,000 54.4
TOTAL
Total 1,644,200 915,500 728,700.45 182,000 130.8
SOURCE: Col. 1, Table 35; Cot. 2, Table 113; Col. 5, Table 38.
people and to women. It is possible to measure this effect for 1922—53
by comparing the actual number of top wealth-holders in 1953 with
the number there would have been had the frequencies of top wealth-
holders which obtained in 1922 held for 1953 (Table 114). This
assumes that the total population and age-sex composition of 1953 are
constant. Instead of the actual number of 1.6 million, there would
have been 0.9 million top wealth-holders, or 0.7 million fewer.
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Columns 3 and 4 of Table 114 make it quite clear that it was women
and young people who added relatively great numbers of top wealth-
holders to their ranks, Of the 728,700 "additional" wealth-holders,
253,800 are women and 115,500 are men under 40. Only 86,400
of them are men over 60. It would seem hard to explain this dif-
ferential growth in numbers on any ground other than a change in the
method and timing of transfer of wealth. Thus, it would seem
unlikely that either price change or savings practices could have been
responsible. We would, of course, expect the percentage of the total
population with over $60,000 of wealth to rise over this period because
the average wealth of all adults rose from $5,342 in 1922 to $11,968
in 1953. However, we would expect the frequencies of top wealth-
holders to rise more evenly for all age and sex groups. Increased em-
ployment of women and increased frequency of widowhood would
lead one to predict a differential rise in the percentage of women top
wealth-holders, but it seems doubtful that such a dramatic rise would
have occurred on this account alone.
Suppose we assume that the whole difference in number of top
wealth-holders is due to changes in transfer practice, that is, more gifts
to wives and children, more families living in community property
states, and so forth. Following this assumption, what shift in inequality
of wealth-holding could be explained by the change in transfer
practice? In 1953 1.6 million people actually held $298 billion of
basic variant gross estate (calculated from Table 114). This is com-
patible with 1 per cent of the adult population holding 19 per cent
of the aggregate gross estate. If the $298 billion had been held by only
the 915,500 people shown in column 2 of Table 114, there would be
a much more unequal distribution of wealth, with the top 1 per cent
holding 24 per cent.
In one respect, this tends to overstate the effect of splitting and
earlier transfers, since, as suggested above, there are other factors
which have contributed to the higher frequency of top wealth-holders
in all age and sex groups. This is offset to some extent by the fact
that we do not take account of the splitting which drops people below
$60,000 in 1953. All things considered, it would seem plausible that
changes in transfer practices could account for a fall of several per-
centage points in the share of wealth of the top I per cent. It will be
recalled that by relating price change and changes in savings to the
1922 share, we were able to explain all but three points of the fall
from 32 per cent of total wealth in 1922 to 25 per cent in 1953.
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An alternative way to rationalize the effect of splitting is as follows.
Note first that the top 1 per cent of adults held 25 per cent of all
wealth (gross estate, total wealth variant), or about $310 billion.
To have held 28 per cent, they would have needed $347 billion, or
$36 billion more than they actually held. Does it seem reasonable that
$36 billion could be accounted for by attributing family holdings to
one person? By 1922 standards, in which year 8.5 per cent of the top
wealth-holders were wives, there should have been 85,000 wives in
the 1953 top wealth-holder group, but in fact there were 18 per cent,
or 180,000.16 This difference of about 95,000 we can throw out of
the top 1 per cent, leaving their wealth with their husbands, and in
their place bring in another 95,000 persons from below the cut-off.
For the top 1 per cent this cut-off is at about the $100,000 range.
Multiplying 95,000 times $100,000 gives us $9.5 billion out of the
$36 billion. In addition to this, it may be assumed that some of the
600,000 married men in the top 1 per cent had wives with less wealth
than the $100,000 and hence who were not in the top 1 per cent.
Suppose we say that this number was about 300,000 and that each of
them had $50,000. This would yield a total of $15 billion. Hence
splitting wealth with wives might account for about $24.5 billion,
leaving about $11 billion to be explained by splits with other family
members. Table 114 suggests that a good deal of increase in splitting
with younger men may have occurred between 1922 and 1953, so that
it would seem reasonable to account for the $11 billion in this way.
We conclude that there are two alternative ways to account for
the discrepancy between the individual and the family series. The fact
that the share of wealth held by the top 1 per cent of individuals fell by
three percentage points more than the share held by the top 2 per
cent of "families" (as defined in Chapter 6) is due, we submit, to
changing practices in the transfer of wealth.
It was noted in Chapter 6 that married women formanincreasingly impor-
tant part of the top wealth-holding group. This is presumably due largely to the
increasing importance of community property states and to the increasing fre-
quency of overt gifts from husbands to wives and from parents to daughters. One
independent check upon the data given in Chapter 6 is the percentage of individ-
ual income tax returns filed by married women, i.e., wives filing separate returns.
This was 1.9 per cent in 1922 and 3.2 per cent in 1938. These are the best
years for such a comparison since the total number of returns were about the same
in those two years and legal provisions about filing separate returns were not
notably different. A good continuous series on this relationship cannot be devel-
oped, unfortunately. Ideally, we would like to have the number of returns by
marital status for property income only, by size of income. This seriesis not
available to us.
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Summary Statement on Causes of Changes
in Wealth Inequality, 1922—53
Four separate factors are seen to have contributed to the fall in the
share of wealth held by the top 1 per cent of adults. This share was
32 per cent in 1922, rose to 38 per cent in 1929, fell to 22 per cent
in 1949, and rose to 25 per cent in 1953 (see Table 107, col. 1).
Relative change in the price of assets explains the turning points in
this share, but does not explain the secular drop. Indeed, if only price
changes had occurred, there would have been much greater inequality
in 1953 than in 1922 (see Table 107, col. 3). A second change we
have noted is the shift in composition of estate. In the boom periods
of 1922—29 and 1949—53, the top group reduced its concentration
upon price-sensitive assets and this tended to cut its share somewhat
(see Table 107, col. 4). A third change—one which cut its share
substantially between 1939 and 1949—was a reduction in the share of
all saving of the top group (see Table 107, col. 5). Varying price,
composition, and share of saving leads to a prediction of a fall in
share from 32 per cent in 1922 to 28 per cent in 1953 (Table 107).
However, the actual fall was to 25 per cent. This three-point dis-
crepancy is explained by changing practices in the transfer of wealth.
These changing practices, which have led to a sharp increase over
the thirty-year period in the number of women and younger persons
among top wealth-holders, include a larger population in community
property states, more gifts by living persons to wives and other family
members, and more use of life insurance. The discrepancy between
column 5 and column 1 in Table 107 is thus found to be reconcilable
with the fact that the share of wealth held by the top 2 per cent of
families fell less than the share of the top 1 per cent of adults (see
col. 6).
In making predictions of the future share of wealth which will be
held by the top group, attention should be given to these four changes.
In the future the two most important changes to watch are differential
price changes (which have been very important in 1953—60) and
changes in the share of saving of the top 1 per cent. As long as the
top 1 per cent accounts for as little as 15 per cent of all saving, this
will be a heavy drag on their share of all wealth. Recent experience
suggests that changes in composition of estate and in transfer prac-
tice can be expected to have relatively little influence in determining
the share of wealth to be found in the hands of the next generation
of top wealth-holders.
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